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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
BRYON LEE MOORE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NO. 46429-2018
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR-2017-11703

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Bryon Lee Moore pled guilty to possession of sexually exploitative material, distribution
of sexually exploitative material, and one count of lewd conduct. The district court sentenced
him to an aggregate term of thirty-five years, with ten years fixed. Mr. Moore appeals, and he
argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Moore with five counts of possession of sexually exploitative
material of children, one count of distribution of sexually exploitative material, and one count of
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lewd conduct with a child. (R., pp.64-65.) Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State,
Mr. Moore pied guilty to one count of possession of sexually exploitative material, distribution
of that material, and lewd conduct. (R., pp.90-93; Tr., p.14, L.13-p.15, L.18, p.21, L.24-p.26,
L.18.) The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (R., pp.90-91; Tr., p.14, L.20-p.15,
L.14; see also R., pp.115, 117 (motion and order of dismissal).) The State did not agree to
recommend a particular sentence. (Tr., p.15, Ls.1-7.)
At sentencing, Mr. Moore requested an aggregate sentence of fifteen years, with five
years fixed. (Tr., p.40, Ls.7-10.) The State recommended an aggregate sentence of thirty years,
with twelve years fixed. (Tr., p.42, Ls.2-11.) The district court sentenced Mr. Moore to ten years
fixed for possession of sexually exploitative material; thirty years, with ten years fixed, for
distribution; and thirty-five years, with ten years fixed, for lewd conduct. (Tr., p.52, Ls.14-23.)
The district court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.53, Ls.24-25.)
Accordingly, Mr. Moore received an aggregate sentence of thirty-five years, with ten years fixed,
Mr. Moore timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.10709, 121-23.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence of thirty-five
years, with ten years fixed, upon Mr. Moore following his guilty pleas to possession of sexually
exploitative material, distribution of sexually exploitative material, and lewd conduct?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of
Thirty-Five Years, With Ten Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Moore Following His Guilty Pleas To
Possession And Distribution Of Sexually Exploitative Material And Lewd Conduct
"It is well-established that ' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence."' State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Moore's sentences do not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. §§ 18-1507(2)(a), (3) (ten-year maximum for possession), -1507(2)(d), (4)
(thirty-year maximum for distribution), -1508 (maximum oflife for lewd conduct). Accordingly,
to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Moore "must show that the sentence,
in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." State v.

Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
"'Reasonableness' of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.

Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. "A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution." State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Here, Mr. Moore asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
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should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of the mitigating factors,
including his absence of criminal record, military service, amenability to treatment, and remorse
and acceptance of responsibility.
First, the lack of a serious criminal record supports a lesser sentence for Mr. Moore. "The
absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider." State v. Miller, 151
Idaho 828, 836 (2011 ). "It has long been recognized that '[t ]he first offender should be accorded
more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673
(Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)). Here, as
shown in the PSI, Mr. Moore has no prior arrests or felony convictions. (Presentence
Investigation Report ("PSI"), 1 p. 7.) He has one past misdemeanor charge for failure to purchase
a driver license, but that charge was dismissed. (PSI, p. 7.) Mr. Moore submits the absence of any
prior convictions or arrests supports a more lenient sentence.
Second, Mr. Moore's military service supports a lesser sentence. A defendant's prior
military service is a recognized mitigating factor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 91. In this case, Mr. Moore
enlisted in the Navy in 2000, at the age of eighteen, and he was honorably discharged in 2008.
(PSI, p.10.) He spent one deployment in a Middle East war zone. (Aug. R., p.6.) He did not have
any disciplinary problems in the military. (Aug. R., p.6.)
Third, Mr. Moore was amenable to treatment. (See Tr., p.39, L.24-p.40, L.2.) The
psychosexual evaluation ("PSE") reported Mr. Moore admitted to the offense, felt guilty about
his behavior, and was sorry for the victim. (Aug. R., p.25.) Mr. Moore also reported he wanted
help. (Aug. R., pp.3, 25.) Similarly, the PSE opined Mr. Moore's family would provide support
to prevent re-offending behavior. (Aug. R., p.23.) His family was present at sentencing, and his
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sister wrote a letter in support. (Tr., p.45, Ls.8-24; Aug. R., p.28.) Mr. Moore's amenability to
treatment stands in favor of mitigation.
Finally, Mr. Moore expressed great remorse for his actions and accepted responsibility
for the crimes. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of
mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). During the presentence interview,
Mr. Moore understood that his crimes warranted some term of incarceration. (PSI, p.12.)
Similarly, at sentencing, he recognized, "I have made horrendous choices, and now I must atone
for those choices by the horrendous consequences." (Tr., p.47, Ls.17-18.) He acknowledged,
"I'm sorry" "only goes so far" and "not far enough" based on his actions. (Tr., p.48, Ls.15-18.)
He was "truly deeply, terribly sorry" and would do whatever he could to remedy the harm he
caused to the victims. (Tr., p.48, L.24-p.49, L.4.) Moreover, the prosecutor highlighted his
remorse at sentencing. The prosecutor stated, "In mitigation, this defendant has been very
remorseful, and he has been very, very, very forthcoming with the things that he's done, with his
interests, and all of those things. I think that speaks well of him." (Tr., p.43, Ls.14-17.)
Mr. Moore's acceptance ofresponsibility, remorse, and regret stand in favor of mitigation.
In summary, Mr. Moore argues the district court failed to exercise reason in weighing the
mitigating factors in his case and thus abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
He contends proper consideration of the mitigating circumstances support a more lenient
sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.
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Citation to the PSI refer to the thirty-one page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 27 th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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